Glassholes

Google Glass was amazing technology

Augmented reality, voice commands and a heads-up display

All of this stuff was way ahead of it’s time, and looked like it had been plucked right out of a Sci-Fi film.

So it might be a surprise to us that it completely flopped when it hit the market.

And the reason it flopped was nothing to do with the state-of-the-art tech, but because of who it was used by

It was being paraded around by tech nerds, who may not be the coolest people that you’ve ever met.

This association actually got them the nickname, ‘Glassholes’

It was this association that killed it - because nobody wanted to be that person.

It’s an identity cost - Google Glass asks people to accept being seen as a tech-obsessed weirdo.

I think it’s this association in Coaching that ruins people’s chances of signing up more so than the ‘technology’ within the programme, the knowledge that’s within it, the expertise of the Coach, etc.

The coaching might be excellent, it might be a programme that would genuinely change someone’s life.

But if the marketing positions the person as the problem,

‘Sick of being an ugly fat git?’ ‘Fed up of being a lazy, undisciplined weirdo’ ‘Leaving for work 10 minutes late everyday so you don’t have to walk past the bus stop and have a load of teenagers in school uniforms laugh at what a sorry excuse for a bloke you are’

We need to consider

Would someone want to publicly associate with a brand that announces to the world;

‘I’m broken and I need fixing’

It’s not just the product, it’s also the association with the product.

Sometimes it’s worth thinking less about whether coaching works, and more about whether someone can align with your brand without feeling worse about themselves for needing it.

Connections

• [[Smokers quit for status not health]] — Google Glass and smoking cessation are the same mechanism running in opposite directions. Smokers quit because the identity cost of being seen as disgusting outweighed the pleasure of smoking — the social signal reversed, and behaviour followed. Google Glass failed because the identity cost of being seen as a “Glasshole” outweighed the utility of the technology. In coaching, shame-based marketing creates the same negative identity signal: the programme might work, but if signing up broadcasts “I’m broken,” the identity cost kills the purchase the way social disgust killed smoking. The lesson from both: identity cost trumps product quality every time.

• [[People will choose identity over survival]] — If people will literally choose death over identity threat — continuing to smoke despite knowing it kills them — then choosing not to buy a coaching programme that positions them as broken is a trivially easy identity-protection decision. The Glassholes insight is the commercial version of the survival data: the brain’s identity-protection system does not distinguish between mortal threat and brand association. It vetoes anything that threatens the story you tell about who you are, whether the stakes are your life or your Instagram feed.

• [[People pay a premium for products that signal their values more visibly]] — The Prius commands a $4,200 identity premium because it broadcasts “I care about the environment.” Google Glass demanded an identity tax because it broadcast “I am a tech-obsessed weirdo.” The mechanism is identical but the valence is reversed: one product adds to the buyer’s identity story, the other subtracts from it. Coaching programmes operate on the same spectrum — a brand that signals aspiration and capability commands a premium, whilst one that signals brokenness imposes a tax that no amount of programme quality can offset.

• [[If a product appeals to everyone, it cannot signal anything about the consumer. So consumers shop on the basis of features and price]] — Google Glass did not fail because it appealed to everyone — it failed because it signalled the wrong thing about its consumer. This is the inverse of the commodity trap: Google Glass had an extremely strong identity signal, but it was a repellent one. Coaching programmes can fall into either failure mode — no signal (commodity, competing on price) or wrong signal (shame-based marketing, competing against the buyer’s own self-image). The sweet spot is a signal strong enough to filter but aspirational enough to attract.

• [[Shame Loses Its Power When Spoken Aloud]] — Brown’s insight that shame thrives in secrecy, silence, and judgement illuminates why shame-based coaching marketing is structurally self-defeating. The marketing amplifies exactly the conditions shame needs to grow: it names the person’s perceived inadequacy publicly, attaches it to a visible brand, and invites judgement from anyone who sees the association. The person considering sign-up is not just buying coaching — they are contemplating a public confession of inadequacy. A brand that instead normalises the struggle (speaking shame aloud in Brown’s terms) dissolves the identity cost rather than amplifying it.

• [[Social Rejection Activates the Same Brain Regions as Physical Pain]] — The “Glasshole” label was not merely embarrassing — it activated the same neural pain circuits as physical injury. When coaching marketing positions the buyer as broken, the brain processes the potential social rejection (being seen as someone who “needs fixing”) through the same pain pathways it uses for a broken bone. This is why rational arguments about programme quality cannot overcome shame-based positioning: you are asking someone to voluntarily walk into a pain stimulus, and the pain system does not negotiate with product features.

• [[Every weakness contains evidence of a hidden strength]] — The skeleton protocol offers the structural antidote to the Glassholes problem. Instead of positioning the client’s struggle as a weakness that needs fixing (which creates identity cost), the reframe asks: is the struggle itself evidence of a hidden strength? The person who overthinks their food is not broken — their overthinking may be evidence of conscientiousness operating in the wrong domain. This inverts the identity signal: the brand no longer says “you are broken,” it says “you have a strength that is currently misdirected.” The association shifts from shame to recognition.

• [[Identity appeals change behaviour where rational arguments fail]] — The Don’t Mess With Texas campaign reduced littering by 29 per cent using identity framing rather than rational argument. Google Glass tried to sell on rational features (augmented reality, voice commands) but was destroyed by identity cost. Coaching programmes that sell on rational features (“evidence-based,” “12-week programme,” “proven methodology”) whilst ignoring the identity signal are making the same error. The question is not “does this work?” but “does choosing this make me feel like the person I want to be?” Identity appeals succeed where feature lists fail because the decision is made by the identity system, not the evaluation system.

Tensions

• Some identity cost is unavoidable and may be necessary. Therapy, addiction recovery, and crisis intervention all carry inherent identity costs — seeking help implies a problem. The Glassholes framing suggests these costs should be eliminated, but some transformation genuinely requires the person to acknowledge a difficulty. The question is whether the identity cost is imposed by the marketing (unnecessary and destructive) or inherent to the change process (uncomfortable but necessary). Removing all identity cost risks producing brands so aspirational they attract people who do not actually need the service.

• The identity cost diagnosis can become an excuse for poor product quality. If a coaching programme is not selling, it is tempting to blame the brand’s identity signal rather than interrogate the programme itself. “Our marketing positions people as broken” is a more comfortable diagnosis than “our coaching is mediocre.” The Glassholes framing is powerful, but it should not become a universal explanation for poor conversion — sometimes the technology (or the coaching) genuinely is the problem, and fixing the signal without fixing the substance produces a well-branded programme that still fails to deliver.